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PAVLO R. BLAVATSKYY
AXIOMATIZATION OF A PREFERENCE FOR MOST
PROBABLE WINNER
ABSTRACT. In binary choice between discrete outcome lotteries, an
individual may prefer lottery L1 to lottery L2 when the probability
that L1 delivers a better outcome than L2 is higher than the probabil-
ity that L2 delivers a better outcome than L1. Such a preference can be
rationalized by three standard axioms (solvability, convexity and symme-
try) and one less standard axiom (a fanning-in). A preference for the
most probable winner can be represented by a skew-symmetric bilinear
utility function. Such a utility function has the structure of a regret the-
ory when lottery outcomes are perceived as ordinal and the assumption
of regret aversion is replaced with a preference for a win. The empirical
evidence supporting the proposed system of axioms is discussed.
KEY WORDS: expected utility theory, axiomatization, betweenness, fan-
ning-in, skew-symmetric bilinear utility, regret theory
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C91, D81
1. INTRODUCTION
An individual has menu-dependent preferences when his pref-
erence between two choice options depends on the availability
of additional options (content of the choice set). The litera-
ture often describes such preferences as “context-dependent”
(e.g. Stewart et al. (2003), Tversky and Simonson (1993)).
The context of a choice situation is a very general con-
cept, however, that can be also used to describe aspects
other than the content of a choice set. A more suitable
term to describe a very speciﬁc phenomenon—the dependence
of individual preferences on the menu of a choice set—is
menu-dependence.
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In choice under risk (Knight (1921)), a special type of menu-
dependent preference is a preference for a lottery that is most
probable to outperform all other feasible lotteries. The litera-
ture refers to such a preference as “a preference for probabilis-
tically prevailing lottery” (e.g. Bar-Hillel and Margalit (1988))
or “the criterion of the maximum likelihood to be the great-
est” (e.g. Blyth, (1972)). Recent experimental evidence suggests
that a preference for a most probable winner prevails in binary
choice between lottery frequencies of equal expected value (Bla-
vatskyy, 2003) and in small feedback-based problems (e.g. Bar-
ron and Erev (2003)), Blavatskyy (2003a). In this paper, I build
a system of axioms rationalizing a preference for a most prob-
able winner in binary choice.
Given the probability distributions of any two independent
lotteries, it is always possible to calculate directly the (rel-
ative) probability of each lottery to outperform the other.
Such calculation requires little cognitive effort when the state
space (a joint distribution of lotteries) is available. Blavatskyy
(2003) provides experimental evidence that a preference for
most probable winner emerges when an individual follows a
simple majority rule—to pick up a lottery that gives a bet-
ter outcome in the majority of (equally probable) states of
the world. In such a cognitively undemanding environment
it is plausible to assume that an individual follows a simple
behavioral rule—he calculates the relative probabilities of each
lottery to win over the other lotteries and then maximizes
among those probabilities. This behavioral rule (the heuristic
of relative probability comparisons) resembles one-reason fast
and frugal decision making (e.g. Gigerenzer and Goldstein
(1996)). Like all heuristics, it ignores some of the available
information by treating lottery outcomes as ordinal. Addition-
ally, like all heuristics, this behavioral rule applies only to a
bounded subset of decision problems, e.g. when lotteries have
equal or similar expected values.
In cognitively demanding environments, a straightforward
calculation of relative probabilities of a lottery to win over
others, however, demands more cognitive effort. Examples
include situations when probability information is presented
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visually (e.g. Tversky (1969)) or not presented at all (e.g.
Barron and Erev (2003)), when lotteries have many outcomes
or an individual faces a choice among many lotteries.
Nevertheless, assuming an individual preference for most pro-
bable winner it is possible to explain observed decision mak-
ing in such environments, as demonstrated in Blavatskyy
(2003a) in his alternative explanation of the data in Barron
and Erev (2003).
Since individuals are likely to use only simple rules of
thumb (e.g. Gigerenzer et al. (1999)), a descriptive ﬁt of a
preference for most probable winner in cognitively demand-
ing decision environments can be explained only through a
general theory of preference. Unlike a heuristic approach
that describes a plausible psychological process underlying
observed decision making (e.g. Newell and Shanks (2003)), a
theory of preference states that an individual has an underly-
ing preference for most probable winner. The purpose of this
paper is to explore the theoretical properties of an individual’s
preference for most probable winner, and how it is related
to various non-expected utility theories (e.g. Starmer (2000)).
Speciﬁcally, the paper explores what normative axioms are
necessary and sufﬁcient for rationalizing such preference, and
how those axioms accord with the experimental evidence.
The proposed axiomatization provides theoretical insights
into an individual’s preference for most probable winner
and highlights some surprising connections to other deci-
sion theories. It also provides “thought experiment” evidence
for a descriptive validity of the theory (e.g. Friedman and
Savage (1952)), Machina (1982). However, “thought experi-
ment” evidence can be drastically different from actual decision
making (e.g. Tversky (1969)). Therefore, the paper also focuses
on the experimental evidence supposedly documenting the sys-
tematic violation of the proposed axioms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the system of axioms and derives a utility
function representation and family of indifference curves. The
descriptive validity of the proposed axioms is discussed in sec-
tion 3. Section 4 concludes.
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2. THE SYSTEM OF AXIOMS
2.1. Basic deﬁnitions
An option A is strictly preferred to option B, or AB, if an
individual chooses A and is not willing to choose B from the
choice set {A,B}. An individual is indifferent between choice
options A and B, or A∼B, if the choice of A and the choice
of B are equally possible from the choice set {A,B}.
This paper deals with individuals’ binary choices between
discrete lotteries. The set of lottery outcomes X = {x1, . . . xn}
is ﬁnite and ordered in such a way that x1 ≺ · · · ≺ xn. Out-
comes are not necessarily monetary (measured in reals). They
are only required to be strictly ordered in terms of subjective
preference. A lottery L(p1, . . . , pn) is deﬁned as a mapping
L :X → [0,1]n, where pi ∈ [0,1] is the probability of occurrence
of outcome xi , i ∈{1, . . . , n} and
∑n
i=1 pi =1.
In a joint independent distribution of any two lotter-
ies L1 (p1, . . . , pn) and L2 (q1, . . . , qn) only three events are
possible: L1 delivers a better outcome than L2 (state s1),
L2 delivers a better outcome than L1 (state s2) and lotter-
ies L1,L2 deliver the same outcome (state s3). An individual
has a preference for most probable winner when Equation (1)
holds for any two lotteries L1 and L2. This decision rule is
rationalized below.
L1 L2 ⇔prob (s1)>prob (s2)⇔
n−1∑
i=1
qi
⎛
⎝1−
i∑
j=1
pj
⎞
⎠>
>
n−1∑
i=1
pi
⎛
⎝1−
i∑
j=1
qj
⎞
⎠ (1)
In the remainder of this paper each pair of lotteries is
assumed to be statistically independent. This assumption is
not restricting the normative or descriptive applications of
the model. A preference for most probable winner is easily
extendable on the domain of acts (Savage (1954)) In a binary
choice between two acts an individual recodes the outcome
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of each act as a relative gain (e.g. +1) or a relative loss
(e.g. −1) and then chooses the act that yields a relative gain
with the highest probability. Such rule of thumb is intuitively
plausible and cognitively undemanding. Therefore, there is no
apparent reason for axiomatizing such preference when a joint
distribution of lotteries (state space) is given. On the contrary,
a preference for most probable winner over independent lot-
teries is not immediately appealing. This is the main reason
why this axiomatization is restricted to independent lotteries.
2.2. Standard axioms
This section presents a set of axioms that were already used
in other axiomatizations of decision theories (e.g. Fishburn
(1982), (1988)). Notably, this set of standard axioms does not
contain the transitivity axiom. Indeed, a preference for most
probable winner can be intransitive (e.g. Blyth (1972)). Intu-
itively, the structure of such preference is foremost based on
the relative (binary) comparisons rather than on a separate
(menu-independent) evaluation of lotteries. For example, lot-
tery L1 that yields C4 with probability  =
(√
5−1
)/
2≈0.618
and C1 otherwise is more probable to deliver a higher out-
come than C3. Lottery L2 that yields C2 with probability 
and C5 otherwise is more probable to deliver a lower outcome
than C3. However, L2 delivers a higher outcome than L1 with
probability . Hence, a preference for most probable winner
does not necessarily impose a transitive order on lotteries.
Axiom 1 (Solvability). For any three lotteries L1,L2,L3 such
that L1 L2 and L2 L3 there is a number α∈ (0,1) such that
αL1 + (1−α)L3 ∼L2
Axiom 2 (Convexity). For any three lotteries L1,L2,L3 and
for any number α∈ (0,1):
(a) if L1 L2 and L1 
L3 then L1 αL2 + (1−α)L3,
(b) if L1 ∼L2 and L1 ∼L3 then L1 ∼αL2 + (1−α)L3,
(c) if L1 L2 and L3 
L2 then αL1 + (1−α)L3 L2.
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Axiom 3 (Symmetry). For any three lotteries L1,L2,L3 such
that L1 L2, L2 L3, L1 L3, L2 ∼ 0.5L1 + 0.5L3 and for any
number α∈ (0,1):
αL1+(1−α)L3∼0.5L1+0.5L2 if and only if αL3+(1−α)L1
∼ 0.5L3 +0.5L2.
Fishburn (1982, 1988) proved the following theorem.
THEOREM 1. Axioms 1–3 hold if and only if there is a skew-
symmetric function ψ :X×X→R (unique up to a multiplication
by a positive constant) such that for any two lotteries L1(p1, . . . ,
pn) and L2 (q1, . . . , qn) : L1 L2 if and only if
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piqjψ
(
xi, xj
)
>0.
2.3. A fanning-in axiom
A fanning-in axiom assumes a particular type of diminish-
ing sensitivity to probability. Speciﬁcally, when probability
mass is largely shifted to the best or the worst outcome, tiny
probabilities attached to the intermediate outcomes become
progressively unimportant for decision. This axiom has not
been used in other axiomatizations in the literature.
Axiom 4 (A fanning-in). For any lottery L1 that delivers xi
with probability pi and xn otherwise, and for any lottery L2
that delivers xj xi with probability pj and xn otherwise, such
that L1∼L2: limpi→0 pj
/
pi =1. For any lottery L3 that delivers
xk with probability pk and x1 otherwise, and for any lottery L4
that delivers xl xk with probability pl and x1 otherwise, such
that L3 ∼L4: limpl→0 pk
/
pl =1.
To understand the logic behind axiom 4, consider ﬁrst the sit-
uation when pi → 0. First of all, notice that pj > pi because
xi ≺ xj ≺ xn. If pi → 0, lottery L1 approaches to the lot-
tery L¯ (0, . . . ,0,1), which gives the best possible outcome
xn for sure. Since there could be no other lottery L˜2 such
that L˜2 ∼ L¯ it must be the case that limpi→0 pj = 0. When
two lotteries L1,L2 approach to the lottery L¯ the absolute
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differences in tiny probabilities attached to the not-best out-
come disappear. Axiom 4 additionally requires that the relative
differences in probabilities attached to the not-best outcome
also disappear as L1 and L2 become increasingly similar to L¯
i.e. limpi→0 pj
/
pi =1.
Expected utility theory violates axiom 4 because it implies
that limpi→0 pj
/
pi >1. When limpi→0 pj
/
pi =1 then an individ-
ual’s indifference curves plotted in the probability triangle1 (e.g.
Machina, 1982) are not parallel but fanning-in, which explains
the name of the axiom. The assumption limpi→0 pj
/
pi =1
also implies that an individual becomes inﬁnitely risk seeking
when probability mass is largely shifted to the best outcome.
Notice that axiom 4 is stronger than the reversed deﬁni-
tion of fanning-out (hypothesis II) proposed by Machina
(1982).
The second part of axiom 4 assumes that the above
logical argument applies as well to the situation when lot-
teries L3 (1−pk,0, . . . ,0, pk,0, . . . ,0) and L4(1−pl,0, . . . ,0, pl,
0, . . . ,0), L3 ∼L4, approach to the lottery L(1,0, . . . ,0), which
gives the worst possible outcome x1 for sure. The only differ-
ence is that an individual becomes inﬁnitely risk averse when
probability mass is largely shifted to the worst outcome. The
implication of axiom 4 that an individual becomes risk seek-
ing (averse) when probability mass is largely shifted to the best
(worst) outcome is the counterpart of Machina’s intuition for
universal fanning out (Machina, 1987, pp. 129–130). As shown
in the proof of theorem 2 below the intuitive role of axiom 4
is “to erase” the cardinal difference between lottery outcomes.
An individual who maximizes the probability of a relative gain
ignores the information about the size of this gain, i.e. he or
she treats lottery outcomes in an ordinal way.
THEOREM 2. Axioms 1–4 hold if and only if Equation (1)
holds for any two lotteries L1 and L2.
Proof is presented in the appendix.
Theorem 2 implies that an individual’s preference for most
probable winner is a special case of the skew-symmetric bilin-
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ear utility theory (e.g. Fishburn, 1982, 1988). The addition of
a fanning-in axiom restricts a general skew-symmetric bilinear
functional derived by Fishburn so that only the ordinal differ-
ence in lottery outcomes is taken into account. When lotteries
are distributed independently, skew-symmetric bilinear utility
theory coincides with regret theory (e.g. Loomes and Sugden,
1982, 1987). When the anticipated net advantage function of
regret theory is ordinal in outcomes (e.g. Equation (4) in the
appendix), the decision rule of regret theory reduces to a pref-
erence for most probable winner. However, such “ordinal”
function ψ
(
xi, xj
)
always violates a key assumption of regret
theory, regret aversion, which requires ∀x > y > z ⇒ψ (x, z) >
ψ (x, y)+ψ (y, z) (e.g. Loomes et al., 1992). In terms of regret
theory the “ordinal” function ψ
(
xi, xj
)
of a preference for
most probable winner always reﬂects regret seeking: ∀x >y >
z⇒ψ (x, z)<ψ (x, y)+ψ (y, z).
Figure 1 plots themap of the indifference curves representing a
preference for most probable winner inside the probability tri-
angle (Machina, 1982). The same map of indifference curves
is implied by the weighted utility theory when the weight of
the medium outcome is greater than unity (e.g. Chew and
Waller, 1986). Notice that this indifference map is indepen-
dent of individual-speciﬁc parameters (functions) and cardi-
nal measures of lottery outcomes, i.e. the map is invariant
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Probability 
of the best 
outcome x3
Probability of the worst outcome x1
Figure 1. Family of indifference curves inside the probability triangle.
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for all triples of lottery outcomes such that x1 ≺ x2 ≺ x3. The
family of indifference curves implied by axioms 1–4 consists
of straight lines with different slopes reﬂecting a changing
individual attitude towards risk Speciﬁcally, a universal fan-
ning-in, as in ﬁgure 1, shows that an individual becomes more
risk seeking (averse) when probability mass is shifted to the
best (worst) outcome, which Chew and Waller (1986) call “the
heavy hypothesis”. Figure 1 shows that indifference curves do
not intersect inside the probability triangle, i.e. preferences are
transitive. In a special case when n = 3, axioms 1–4 imply a
transitivity axiom (see working paper Blavatskyy (2004) for a
formal proof).
Figure 1 demonstrates that an individual is risk neutral
along the 45◦ line on ﬁgure 1, i.e. he or she is exactly indiffer-
ent between a medium outcome for sure and a 50%-50%
chance of the best and the worst outcome. This is a direct
consequence of the symmetry axiom. The symmetry axiom
probably gains the most of its intuitive appeal when lottery
outcomes are “similar” to each other. Hence, a preference for
most probable winner is especially appealing when lotteries
have equal or similar expected values.
3. DESCRIPTIVE VALIDITY OF PROPOSED AXIOMS
This section critically reviews the existing experimental evi-
dence on the alleged violations of the four proposed axioms.
To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies document-
ing any systematic violations of axiom 1 (solvability).
3.1. Violations of betweenness
Part b) of Axiom 2 (convexity) implies a betweenness axiom.
According to this axiom if an individual is indifferent between
two lotteries, then their probability mixture is equally good.
Systematic violations of the betweenness are reported in
Coombs and Huang (1976), Chew and Waller (1986), Camerer
(1989), Battalio et al. (1990), Gigliotti and Sopher (1993) and
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Camerer and Ho (1994). However, Blavatskyy (2005) recently
demonstrated that these experimental ﬁndings can be alterna-
tively attributed to the effect of random errors.
An asymmetric split between revealed quasi-concave and
quasi-convex preferences was conventionally interpreted as evi-
dence of the violations of the betweenness. Blavatskyy (2005)
shows that it can be caused by random errors unless the modal
choice pattern is inconsistent with the betweenness. The latter
case is documented only in few studies. Prelec (1990) ﬁnds that
76% of subjects reveal quasi-concave preferences and only 24%
of subjects respect betweenness when the probability mass of
the hypothetical lotteries is largely shifted to the worst outcome.
Camerer and Ho (1994) replicate this result for one lottery tri-
ple “TUV” with real payoffs. Bernasconi (1994) ﬁnds a strong
asymmetric violation of betweenness when betweenness is not
a modal choice pattern in two lottery pairs (1 and 3).
3.2. Evidence for fanning-in
A survey of experiments testing the shape of individuals’
indifference curves suggests that there is a non-negligible
evidence for fanning-out going back to the Allais paradox
(e.g. Allais, 1953) and common consequence and common
ratio effects (Starmer, 2000). However, a universal fanning-out
hypothesis (Machina, 1982) is rejected. There is a growing evi-
dence that supports a universal fanning-in. This new evidence
suggests that indifference curves tend to fan in when the prob-
ability mass is associated with the best and the worst outcome
and tend to fan out when the probability mass is associated
with medium outcomes.2 In addition, the evidence for fan-
ning-in in all regions of the probability triangle has recently
emerged.
Conlisk (1989) ﬁnds strong experimental support for the
type of fanning-in implied by axiom 4–53% and 80% of
subjects choose a more risky gamble in a common conse-
quence problem when probability mass is largely shifted to
the medium and the best outcome, correspondingly. This ﬁnd-
ing can be interpreted as an individual’s indifference curves
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becoming almost horizontal when probability mass is largely
shifted to the best outcome. Analogously, the so-called verti-
cal fanning-in is documented in Starmer and Sugden (1989),
Camerer (1989) p. 92 and Battalio et al. (1990). Wu and
Gonzalez (1998) p. 119 report a vertical fanning-in when the
probability of the best outcome is above 0.33 and a vertical
fanning-out when it is below 0.33.
Prelec (1990) and Kagel et al. (1990) ﬁnd fanning-in when
probability mass is largely shifted to the worst outcome. Wu
and Gonzalez (1996) report the so-called horizontal fanning-
in when a probability of the worst outcome is above 0.63
and a horizontal fanning-out when it is below 0.63. Camerer
(1989) p. 92 ﬁnds a similar evidence for small gains.
Bernasconi (1994) p. 63 ﬁnds an experimental evidence
for fanning-in by observing a reverse common ratio effect.
Cubitt and Sugden (2001), Bosman and van Winden (2001)
and Cubitt et al. (2004) ﬁnd an indirect evidence for a
reverse common ratio effect in dynamic decision making
under risk. Barron and Erev (2003) ﬁnd a reverse com-
mon ratio effect in small feedback-based decision making.
Battalio et al. (1990) and Thaler and Johnson (1990) ﬁnd an
evidence for fanning-in, i.e. an increased risk seeking for
stochastically dominant lotteries when lotteries involve only
guaranteed gains. Finally, Starmer (1992) and Humphrey and
Verschoor (2004) ﬁnd strong evidence consistent with a uni-
versal fanning-in in all regions of the probability triangle.
The above literature elicits fanning-in/out of an individ-
ual’s indifference curves from an observed binary choice in
a common consequence or common ratio problem involving
lotteries typically deﬁned on a common three-outcome struc-
ture. Therefore, the main ﬁndings from this literature can be
summarized in the probability triangle presented in Figure 2.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The proposed axiomatization explores theoretical features of
an individual’s preference for most probable winner in a binary
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 Kagel et al ’90  
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Figure 2. Empirical evidence for fanning-in.
choice under risk. Although such preference is implied by a
simplistic behavioral rule (the heuristic of relative probability
comparisons), I ﬁnd some surprising perhaps even unexpected
connections with other decision theories (skew-symmetric bilin-
ear utility, weighted utility and regret theory). A preference for
most probable winner is rationalized by four axioms: solvabil-
ity, convexity, symmetry and a fanning-in. Notably, transitivity
of preferences is not required. The present paper deals with
binary choice; a natural extension of this work is to axiomatize
a preference for most probable winner in a choice among many
lotteries.
A preference for most probable winner falls into the betwe-
enness class of decision theories that assume the linearity in
probability of the sets {L :L∼L0} ,∀L0. The alleged systematic
violations of betweenness found in the experimental literature
in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s can be explained within the
concept of a stochastic utility developed in the mid 1990’s. If
the experimental evidence is reevaluated in the light of notions
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of stochastic utility, the betweenness axiom turns out to be
quite descriptive.
Experimental evidence also emerges for universal fanning-in
of indifference curves. However, this evidence seems to be
stronger for some areas of the probability triangle than for
others. The experimental evidence for the system of axi-
oms proposed here to rationalize an individual’s preference
for most probable winner provides indirect evidence for the
domain of applicability of the heuristic of relative probability
comparisons.
A preference for most probable is a special case of a
skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory and regret theory when
outcomes are perceived as ordinal and the assumption of
regret aversion is replaced with a preference for a win. Thus,
an individual’s preference for most probable winner is a sim-
pliﬁed mirror image of regret theory.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2. According to Theorem 1, axioms 1–
3 hold if and only if there is a skew-symmetric function
ψ (., .) such that for any two lotteries L1 (p1, . . . , pn) and
L2 (q1, . . . , qn): L1  L2 ⇔
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 piqjψ
(
xi, xj
)
> 0. For a
speciﬁc pair of lotteries L1 and L2 described in the ﬁrst part
of axiom 4 the last statement can be rewritten as Equation
(2).
L1 ∼L2 ⇔pipjψ
(
xi, xj
)+pi
(
1−pj
)
ψ (xi, xn)+ (1−pi)pj
ψ
(
xn, xj
)+ (1−pi)
(
1−pj
)
ψ (xn, xn)=0. (2)
The right-hand side of (2) can be rewritten as equation (3).
pj = piψ (xi, xn)+ (1−pi)ψ (xn, xn)
piψ (xi, xn)+ (1−pi)ψ (xn, xn)−piψ
(
xi, xj
)− (1−pi)ψ
(
xn, xj
) .
(3)
Taking the limit from both sides of (3) when pi → 0 we
obtain that limpi→0 pj = 0 only if ψ (xn, xn) = 0. Further-
more, limpi→0 pj
/
pi =1 if and only if ψ (xi, xn)=−ψ
(
xn, xj
)=
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ψ
(
xj , xn
)
with the latter equality due to the skew-symmetric
property of function ψ (., .). Following the same argument for
a pair of lotteries L3 and L4 described in the second part of
axiom 4 we obtain that ψ (x1, xl)=ψ (x1, xk), ∀k, l ∈{2, . . . , n}.
Function ψ (., .) then has the following form:
ψ
(
xi, xj
)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
a i >j,
0 i = j,
−a i <j,
(4)
where a > 0 is constant. Intuitively, the addition of axiom 4
imposes ordinality on the Fishburn’s function ψ (., .). Thus, axi-
oms 1–4 hold if and only if for any two lotteries L1 (p1, . . . , pn)
and
L2 (q1, . . . , qn) :L1 L2 ⇔
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piqjψ
(
xi, xj
)
>0,
where function ψ (., .) is deﬁned by equation (4). This last state-
ment is algebraically equivalent to equation (1). Q.E.D.
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NOTES
1. Note that lotteries L1,L2, although deﬁned as probability distribu-
tions over n outcomes, have non-zero probabilities attached only to
three outcomes xi, xj , xn. Therefore, lotteries L1,L2 can be plotted in
the probability triangle based only on outcomes xi, xj , xn.
2. Neilson (1992) develops a theory that accommodates this experimental
evidence.
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